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Federalism Through a Global Lens: A Call for
Deferential Judicial Review
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.*
INTRODUCTION
This article examines the effects of judicial review in federalism cases on
governmental flexibility and creativity at the national level. It argues that the
global era in which we now live and the New Deal of the 19 3 0s and beyond have
at least one thing in common, and that is a need for creative approaches at the
federal level to perceived societal problems. New regulatory approaches often
take the form of new mixtures of federal and state power, as well as new public
and private partnerships. While it may seem ironic, some of the deferential con-
stitutional interpretive approaches forged by the Supreme Court during the
New Deal may be best suited for the political experimentation now necessary, if
various levels of government and nonstate actors are to adapt successfully to the
realities and demands of a global economy.
During the New Deal, we were coming to grips as a nation with the realities
and societal needs of a national economy. Communications had become
national, as had our transportation needs and capabilities. Commerce was now
national, as were the markets for securities, labor, energy, and natural resources.'
The Supreme Court initially struck down federal legislation seeking to regulate
aspects of these national markets, as if any changes that were to occur had to con-
form to a vision of the economy formulated in terms of nineteenth century ide-
ologies and technologies.2 Eventually, with what we have come to refer to as the
*Roscoe C. O'Byrne Professor of Law, Indiana University School of Law and Director, Insti-
tute for Advanced Study, Indiana University.
1. See generally E.W. HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1966) (discuss-
ing the problem of aligning the theories of democracy and industrialization and of nationalizing
the American economy during the New Deal).
2. See, e.g., Louisville Joint Stock Land Bank v. Radford, 295 U.S. 555 (1935) (Frazier-Lemke
act); A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495 (1935) (section 3 of National In-
dustrial Recovery Act); R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Alton R.R., 295 U.S. 330 (1935) (Railroad Retirement Act);
Pan. Ref. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388 (1935) (section 9 of National Industrial Recovery Act). But see
Perry v. United States, 294 U.S. 330 (1935); Nortz v. United States, 294 U.S. 317 (1935); Norman v.
Baltimore & Ohio R.R., 294 U.S. 240 (1935), all sustaining the validity of Joint Resolution of June 5,
1933, H.R.J. Res. 192, 73d Cong. (1933) (declaring gold payment contracts illegal).
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"switch in time that saved nine," an overreaching Supreme Court learned to re-
spect the political experimentation that a majority of Congress believed was nec-
essary.3 When it came to judicial review of the economic legislation of the New
Deal, the Court developed an appropriately deferential rational basis test that it
applied to these statutes. New Deal legislation easily survived such review.4 As a
result of the application of this new deferential standard of judicial review, the
Court essentially stayed out of the economic politics of the New Deal.5
Today, we are still learning how best to live with and, if possible, govern a glo-
bal economy. A variety of questions confront us. How do we govern globaliza-
tion? And what exactly is globalization? Is it a set of neoliberal socioeconomic
processes that know few limits or boundaries and, like the markets that drive
them, simply extend, in an inevitably linear fashion, over, through, and beyond
the governmental structures of nation states? Or are these global processes capable
of transformation or resistance at the national and local levels? Can citizens at the
domestic level of governance not only resist these forces but transform them as
well, by taking into account noneconomic values and concerns, such as those tra-
ditionally associated with the New Deal's social safety net-welfare, social secu-
rity, health care, etc? How are the voices of citizens who favor such views to be
heard, especially if these issues are increasingly left to the private sector?
Globalization can mean many things-from pure laissez-faire markets to the
regulatory demands of the World Trade Organization (WTO). The kind of glo-
bal perspective that lawmakers adopt will affect how they choose to resist or facil-
itate the changes that globalization appears to promote. It also will affect the way
they use distinctions that once helped us to allocate power and sort out the respon-
sibility for its exercise. Given the de-centered nature of the global state, 6 however,
and the ways in which the global economy now integrates itself throughout na-
tional economies, distinctions developed in the context of a national economy, dis-
tinctions such as public and private, state and federal, national and international,
domestic and foreign, or local and global, no longer accurately capture or reflect
the new power relationships to which these distinctions once applied. There is a
tendency on the part of courts to treat changes in the allocation of what is public
3. See, e.g., West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937).
4. Id. See also Phillips Petroleum Corp v. Wisconsin, 347 U.S. 672 (1954).
5. See ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN A GLOBAL ERA 8-24 (1992).
6. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., The Globalizing State: A Future-Oriented Perspective on the Public!
Private Distinction, Federalism, and Democracy, 31 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 769, 812-16 (1998) [here-
inafter The Globalizing State].
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or what is private, or what is federal and what is state, as if they all involved zero-
sum shifts of power; however, globalization does more that reallocate power
among pre-existing categories. It changes the power relationships within those
categories, requiring a reinvention, if you will, of the very meaning of those terms.
The role that courts are playing and will play in the future in this process of
reinvention is crucial and can have long-run significance; however, this role is
usually indirect. The reforms that produce the litigation coming before the
courts are not labeled "The Global Deal." Rather, the cases tend to involve the
increasing use of hybrid public/private arrangements where private enterprise
now provides services once handled exclusively by the state. Citizens are now,
for example, increasingly described as consumers or clients in such privatized
arrangements. Courts are asked to determine, for example, the liability of pri-
vate prison guards who negligently handcuffed a prisoner assigned to a private
facility.7 Are privatized prisons private in the sense we might use the word when
referring, perhaps, to IBM, or is this a new way for the public to carry out its col-
lective responsibilities? What once was public is now private. Or courts may find
themselves involved in cases involving federal statutes that regulate what we ex-
pect states to do-for example, tend to local crime issues such as the possession
of guns on school grounds or end domestic violence directed against women.8
What once was traditionally a state concern is now addressed at the federal level.
Questions involving safety and various forms of violence increasingly are
viewed as national in scope. What is really going on here and what are domestic
courts to do? To paraphrase Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, it is my hope that
domestic courts will see the global in the particular, and rule accordingly. But
short of that, at least in the constitutional realm, it is crucial for courts to recog-
nize that this is a time for experimentation and politics at all levels of govern-
ment, not the imposition of nineteenth century concepts of sovereignty that so
often form the basis of Supreme Court decisions involving federalism concerns.
Globalization, as I use the term, refers primarily to processes that have dena-
tionalizing effects on the states. Devolution, quite literally, fragments social issues
by denationalizing solutions and, inevitably, the nature of the problems involved
as well. Devolving welfare responsibility or housing for the poor to the state level
7. See Richardson v. McKnight, 521 U.S. 399 (1997).
8. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598
(2000).
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means individual states can and will vary not only in their approaches to such is-
sues, but in the priority they give to them. As states compete for investment and
the retention of taxpayers, they have distinct incentives to minimize the costs of re-
distributive programs such as welfare, Medicaid, or poverty programs in general.
Yet, these were precisely the kinds of programs that Congress tried to (and to a
large extent did) send back to the states in the 1990s. The agenda was, if not the
elimination of such federally supported programs, their minimization in terms of
importance and costs at the federal and national level. Though the theory of dev-
olution is that it increases democracy by bringing decisions closer to those directly
affected by them, it is, in certain contexts, actually more likely to narrow the range
and effectiveness of democratic participants by minimizing the political strength
of groups whose members are more effective and whose numbers are more im-
pressive on a national level than on a local level. 9
The turn toward devolution in Congress and the revival of doctrines of fed-
eralism in the courts can have untoward effects on politics and policy makers at all
levels of government, particularly when the changes involved are premised on a
conception of the state that predates the global economy as we know it today. The
politics giving rise to such reforms in Congress can, of course, change; however,
constitutional decisions by the courts are more lasting. They also, inevitably, have
a way of framing the political debates that should go on in the legislative and ex-
ecutive branches of government. This article looks at federalism through a global
lens, and argues that the analytic tools the Supreme Court has used in recent fed-
eralism opinions are inappropriate for the nature of government and governance
today. The article concludes with a plea for judicial restraint and a doctrinal ap-
proach to such power allocation issues not unlike that used by the courts during
the New Deal. The similarity in deferential approaches to judicial review should
not, however, be associated with retaining or returning to an earlier time, as far as
the substance and methods of regulation are concerned. Rather, deference is to en-
sure that there can be a maximum of innovation and creativity between and
among various levels of government and nonstate actors as well, when it comes to
coping with societal problems that are global in scope today.
9. See, e.g., MATTHEW A. CRENSON & BENJAMIN GINSBERG, DOWNSIZING DEMOCRACY: How
AMERICA SIDELINED ITS CITIZENS AND PRIVATIZED ITS PUBLIC 232-33 (2002).
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I. GLOBALIZATION AND FEDERALISM
Since the founding of the republic, power in the United States has flowed
from the states to the national government."0 As local economies became more
integrated with a growing national economy, the logic of Supreme Court deci-
sions, particularly those after 1937, almost always resolved disputes between fed-
eral and state levels of government in favor of national power." Post-New Deal,
the outcomes in cases involving the scope of the Commerce Clause of the Con-
stitution seemingly had become such a foregone conclusion that it prompted
then Justice Rehnquist's pointed concurrence in judgment in Hodel v. Virginia
Surface Mining and Reclamation Association:12 "Although it is clear that the
people, through the States, delegated authority to Congress to 'regulate Com-
merce ... among the several States,' ... one could easily get the sense from this
Court's opinions that the federal system exists only at the sufferance of Con-
gress."' 3 Indeed he viewed the proposition that Congress, in our system of gov-
ernment exercises only power delegated to it as "one of the greatest 'fictions' of
our federal system."'4
Chief Justice Rehnquist now speaks for a majority on a Court that ap-
proaches federalism issues in a way far more open to state autonomy and is quite
willing to reject expansive readings of the Commerce Clause. The legacy of the
Rehnquist court may very well be that in the end its constitutional approach to
federalism ultimately prevailed. The Court has taken issue with attempts by the
federal government to "commandeer" state bureaucracies to carry out federal
mandates." It has breathed new meaning into the Tenth Amendment, arguing,
10. See Philip B. Kurland, The Role of the Supreme Court in American History: A Lawyer's Inter-
pretation, 14 BUCKNELL REV. 16, 16-26 (1966). Parts II and III of this article draw heavily on a re-
vised and updated version of this article that first appeared as The Globalizing State, supra note 6,
at 848-68. A modified version of these sections will also appear in ALFRED C. AMAN, JR., THE
DIMINISHING DEFICIT: TAMING GLOBALIZATION THROUGH LAW REFORM (forthcoming).
11. See West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937) (upholding the constitutionality of
the Washington Minimum Wages for Women Act, in the so-called "switch-in-time that saved
nine" case); see also Felix Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Roberts, 104 U. PA. L. REV. 311, 314-15 (1955)
(showing vote in West Coast Hotel was taken before legislation to expand court was proposed).
12. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Assoc., Inc., 452 U.S. 264 (1981).
13. Id. at 307-08, (quoting U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 3) (citations omitted).
14. Id. at 307.
15. See, e.g., New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144 (1992); Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452
(1991).
ALFRED C. AMAN, JR.
for example, that regulation of guns near schools is too local an issue to be sup-
ported by the Commerce Clause of the Constitution. 6 The reasoning in these
cases suggests a shift in the Court's methodology and philosophy regarding
federal-state issues. This shift in emphasis from federal power to autonomous
state power coincides with economic and political shifts in the global economy
that also encourage the decentralization of power. Further, the Court's approach
to federal-state relations diminishes the flexibility of federal and state policy-
makers to experiment with new regulatory approaches, running the risk of sub-
stantially undermining the range of policy alternatives and administrative
structures necessary for the global state to be effective. 7
Consider, for instance, the Court's invalidation of the Violence Against
Women Act (VAWA) in United States v. Morrison."S Over the dissent of Justice
Souter, joined by three other Justices, the Court held that Congress does not
have the power to pass VAWA. In support of his argument that VAWA is a con-
stitutional exercise of Congress' power, Souter cites "the state support for the Act
based upon the States' acknowledged failure to deal adequately with gender-
based violence in state courts, and the belief of their own law enforcement
agencies that national action is essential."' 9 Justice Breyer, in a separate dissent in
which three Justices joined, emphasizes the procedures Congress engaged in for
the purpose of protecting federalism values:
It provided adequate notice to the States of its intent to legislate in
an "are[a] of traditional state regulation." And in response, attor-
neys general in the overwhelming majority States (38) supported
congressional legislation, telling Congress that "[olur experience
as Attorneys General strengthens our belief that the problem of
violence against women is a national one, requiring federal atten-
tion, federal leadership, and federal funds."2
16. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
17. For a discussion of federalism advocating an alternate view, i.e., that federalism is an empow-
erment of the national government, see Erwin Chemerinsky, The Value of Federalism, 47 FLA. L.
REV. 499,504 (1995) ("[I]t is desirable to have multiple levels of government all with the capability of
dealing with the countless social problems that face the United States as it enters the 21 st century.")
18. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 528, 598 (2000).
19. Id. at 653 (Souter, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 661 (Breyer, J., dissenting) (alteration in original) (citations omitted).
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The states' support for VAWA was further illustrated by the fact that when
the Act was challenged in court, "[t]hirty-six of them ... filed an amicus brief in
support of [the United States], and only one State [took] the respondents' side."'"
Breyer concluded from the procedures adopted by Congress and the over-
whelming support of the states that "the law before us seems to represent an
instance, not of state/federal conflict, but of state/federal efforts to cooperate in
order to help solve a mutually acknowledged national problem."22
The Court's constitutionalized shift in the power relationships between the
nation and the states, its underlying rationale for this change, and a trend toward
devolution in Congress itself are all likely to encourage more competitive mod-
els of the state, at the expense of developing more cooperative understandings of
issues at both the national and the international levels of government. The em-
phasis on the individuality of states increases the transaction costs of reaching
agreements that could apply to all states. In a sense, an extreme view of federal-
ism would make national legislation as difficult as negotiating multilateral trea-
ties. This is not to argue that a race to the bottom is inevitable in such a
situation,23 but it does mean that creative, cooperative approaches to issues may
be constitutionally excluded when they should be subject to political debate. In-
deed, the pre-New Deal era was one characterized by many issues now preva-
lent at the global level, from child labor to monopolistic private power. The
principles of federalism, carried too far, can exacerbate the most significant ex-
ternalities of globalization: democracy deficits and poverty.
A. A Global Perspective on Federalism
The strong-state assumptions currently used by the Supreme Court in its
analysis of federalism issues, coupled with its emphasis on dual citizenship, cost,
and accountability no longer sufficiently capture the heterogeneous quality of
states as actors in today's global economy. Nor do the assumptions capture the
multi-centric complexities of the relationships that now typify the transnational
actors that states seek both to attract and to control or, at least, influence. The
21. Id. at 654 (Souter, J., dissenting).
22. Id. at 662 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
23. See, e.g., Richard L. Revesz, Rehabilitating Interstate Competition: Rethinking the "Race-to-
the-Bottom" Rationale for Federal Environmental Regulation, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1210 (1992). But
see, Daniel C. Esty, Revitalizing Environmental Federalism, 95 MICH. L. REV. 570, 627-38 (1996).
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Court's emphasis on democracy and accountability at the state level over-
estimates the degree of choice states have when working by themselves, espe-
cially when the problems involved simultaneously include state, federal, and
international components. It also underestimates the cosmopolitan nature of
citizens today, and the fact that individuals are able to differentiate among
various levels of power with which they are involved and with which they iden-
tify. A citizen of a particular state is also a citizen of the U.S. and a global citizen
as well. Individuals carry all of these identities with them on a daily basis.24 Our
political processes need to reflect such complexity, not compress it. The power
relationships now involved due to globalization are multi-dimensional, not
simply federal or state, national or international, public or private.
Paradoxically perhaps, globalization exerts a downward pull when it comes
to the exercise of both federal and state power, providing incentives for more
state autonomy and power and more local authority within states.25 At the same
time, globalization also creates pressures from outside the nation-state to take
actions that allow international solutions to problems such as ozone depletion or
global warming.26 In addition, there are horizontal competitive forces at work as
well, brought about by transnational corporations, with economic power some-
times approximating the power of a small state and with the capability of locat-
ing their operations anywhere in the world. Indeed, a multi-centric world,
consisting of non-sovereign power centers pursuing their own private interests,
adds another important power dimension to federalism issues. As a conse-
quence, issues involving sovereignty and democracy arise that go beyond the tra-
ditional discourse of federalism, as it has developed so far. This is true of
citizenship issues as well, as citizens in a global context regularly function on
multiple levels of political awareness.
24. See Martha C. Nussbaum, Patriotism and Cosmopolitanism in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBAT-
ING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM 2,2-20 (Joshua Cohen, ed., 1996); see also Kwame Anthony Appiah,
Cosmopolitan Patriots in FOR LOVE OF COUNTRY: DEBATING THE LIMITS OF PATRIOTISM, supra, at 21-
29.
25. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., A Global Perspective on Current Regulatory Reform: Rejection, Relo-
cation, or Reinvention?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 429, 435-37 (1995). For an argument that
much of what courts claim are rationales for federalism are, in reality, arguments for decentral-
ized management, see Edward L. Ruhin & Malcolm Feeley, Federalism: Some Notes on a National
Neurosis, 41 UCLA L. REV. 903,914 (1994).
26. See RICHARD ELLIOT BENEDICK, OZONE DIPLOMACY-NEw DIRECTIONS IN SAFEGUARDING
THE PLANET (1991).
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B. The Downward Pull of Globalization
Globalization encourages increasingly intense international competition
among nations, states, and cities to attract and keep industries that they believe
can create economic growth in their jurisdictions. Though the location of a plant
or manufacturing operation turns on numerous, primarily cost-related factors,
low taxes and the imposition of minimal regulatory costs usually constitute im-
portant elements of a jurisdiction's strategy to attract industry and jobs to a par-
ticular locale.27 The tax and regulatory policies devised on the local level to
attract industries to a certain locale are often the result of decision-making pro-
cesses that are more akin to local corporatism than to more traditional forms of
democracy. Indeed, one commentator has noted, based on a study of Japanese in-
vestment in the Midwest, that a kind of embedded corporatism best describes
the process by which new investment is sought.2" This involves, among other
things, "an activist local state working with the business class to attract foreign
investment and thereby stimulate the local economy."29 As a result of agree-
ments among business, government, and labor, substantial tax relief and various
other economic and cultural incentives are commonly offered as forms of cur-
rency in this global competition for business."0
Individual states and municipalities within the United States, eager to at-
tract such new investment and to retain its current industries, have a great inter-
est in gaining control of as many factors as possible that affect firms' decisions to
locate to or remain in the jurisdiction. They can create currency for global com-
petition when it comes to providing services (such as welfare) more efficiently
than neighboring states, 31 thereby lowering taxes or entering into incentive
based arrangements with companies they wish to attract to their locale3 2 But this
need not always lead to fewer or less adequately funded services for the poor if
those investments can pay off in the jurisdiction involved. For example, if a state
27. See ROBERT PERRUCCI, JAPANESE AUTO TRANSPLANTS IN THE HEARTLAND: CORPORATISM AND
COMMUNITY 41-76 (1994).
28. Id. at 125-45.
29. Id. at 17.
30. Id. at 131-34.
31. See Alfred C. Aman, Jr., Administrative Law fora New Century, in THE PROVINCE OF ADMIN-
ISTRATIVE LAW 101 (Michael Taggart ed., 1997).
32. J. William Hicks, The Listing of Daimler-Benz A.G. Securities on the NYSE: Conflicting Inter-
ests and Regulatory Policies, 37 GERMAN Y.B. OF INT'L L. 360-85 (1994).
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depends on low wage labor to attract certain kinds of industry, it may not only
have very favorable labor laws, but also low income housing to attract the labor
force it needs.33 Of course, the key point is that economic competition drives so-
cial policy. A sense of decency or what is best for society in the long term are
rationales that are not nearly as persuasive as the ability to be maximally compet-
itive in the global economy.
Closely related to global incentives for regulatory cost-cutting and the im-
position of lower taxes at the federal, state, and local levels is the increased desire
of each particular jurisdiction seeking increases in economic investment to con-
trol its own costs. Relocating federal regulatory responsibility for costly pro-
grams in the individual states arguably gives states the opportunity to create
more global currency by maximizing the efficiency with which they provide
such services, allowing them to reallocate scarce funds in more globally effective
and competitive ways.
There may, of course, be some forms of global competitive currency individ-
ual states should not be allowed to create.34 And there may be national interests
that should take precedence over state concerns, particularly when social safety
net issues are involved. Level playing fields, however, are not necessarily sought
by states when their primary motivation is to compete more effectively with
other states. Moreover, a level playing field within the United States would not
solve the competitive problems of states arising from their competition with
other countries and regions. The multi-centric aspects of the global economy
stem from the multiple state and non-state power centers capable of affecting
where investments may or may not occur. All of these pressures militate in favor
of decentralized and denationalized decision making.
C. The Pullfrom the Top-National and International Pressures
The increase in states' power to control the costs imposed on their inhabit-
ants and potential investors through devolution is, however, only one aspect of
current federalism trends. There are also forces operating simultaneously to re-
inforce federal powers. National standards and approaches may be necessary to
33. CRENSON & GINSBERG, supra note 9, at 232.
34. For example, private prisons' costs should not be lower because the efficiencies of the private
sector were achieved at the expense of constitutional protections available to prisoners.
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prevent the creation of illegitimate global currency,35 stemming, for example,
from the denial of constitutional rights. They also are necessary to achieve cer-
tain levels of regulatory uniformity if businesses are to avoid an unnecessarily
complex patchwork quilt of state rules and regulations. 36 More important, there
also are issues such as the environment, in which it is in the interest of nation-
states to play an active regulatory role at the global level. Effective national par-
ticipation at the global level requires a national "presence" in certain domestic
areas affected by these global concerns. And indeed, international agreements
and multilateral approaches have been increasing at a rapid rate.37 For example,
if there were no effective national control over air pollution, it would be very dif-
ficult for the national government to speak for all fifty states and enter into seri-
ous negotiations at the global level.
The ability of the national government to participate effectively in global is-
sues at the international level also can help mitigate the extremes of global compe-
tition. Along with the trend toward devolution of federal power to the states, there
is also at least the beginning of an evolutionary trend involving the national gov-
ernment sharing more directly in the responsibilities of international gover-
nance.38 At the national level, this trend toward multinational decision making
and problem solving often expresses itself negatively in debates over the undue re-
striction of national sovereignty,39 but international cooperation and multi-
national agreements are nonetheless increasing.4" Yet it would be a mistake to
35. See, e.g., Diane P. Wood, United States Antitrust Law in the Global Market, 1 IND. J. GLOBAL
LEGAL STUD. 409 (1994); see generally Daniel C. Esty, Toward Optimal Environmental Governance,
74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1495 (1999) (arguing that regulation should maximize social welfare).
36. See Daniel C. Esty, Stepping up to the Global Environmental Challenge, 8 FORDHAM ENVTL. L.J.
103, 108-11 (1996); see also, J. William Hicks, Protection of Individual Investors Under U.S. Securities
Laws: The Impact of International Regulatory Competition, I IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 431 (1994).
37. For example, according to the Multilaterals Project at Tufts University, at least 36 major
multilateral environmental treaties have opened for signature since 1972. See Tufts University,
Multilaterals Project, at http://fletcher.tufts.edlu/multilaterals.html (last visited Dec. 9, 2003).
38. See, e.g., id.; WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, OUR COMMON
FUTURE (1992).
39. For example, see the academic debate over sovereignty that occurred when the World Trade Or-
ganization was established. See also Fast Track Legislation: Hearings Before the Senate Commission On
Commerce, Sci., and Transp., 1997 WL 605646 (RD.C.H) (Sept. 30, 1997) [hereinafter Hearings] (com-
ments by Sen. Ernest F Hollings, Member, Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transportation).
40. For a public choice perspective on this overall increase in international agreements, see En-
rico Columbatto & Jonathan Macey, A Public Choice Model of International Economic Cooperation
and the Decline of the Nation State, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 925 (1997).
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assume that recourse to an international approach always means national legisla-
tion or national regulation. Indeed, as we shall see below, delegating authority up-
ward to an international organization such as the WTO can also result in the
imposition of a market-oriented, deregulated approach domestically, reinforcing
decisions by either the Congress or the Court in favor of devolving power to the
states. Such an approach to international delegation can also increase competition
at both the global and domestic levels. Nevertheless, international cooperation
and regulation highlight the importance of the national government's ability to
play an active role at the domestic level even in the context (and even because) of
such supranational governance. To the extent that federal power is limited in this
regard, enforceable international regulatory regimes are more difficult to create
than when only one major decision maker is involved."
D. Horizontal Forces and the Transnational Corporation
Federalism is traditionally seen in vertical terms,42 involving a flow of
power between state and federal centers of authority. Viewed in these terms, a
global perspective introduces not only an additional vertical level of power (the
international "level") but additional horizontal dimensions as well. A global
perspective emphasizes the fact that states outside the United States now play an
increasingly important role when it comes to global competition and it also high-
lights the significant role nonstate actors, such as multinational corporations,
now play in influencing local legal regimes and policies.43 Their ability to render
a sense of place relatively irrelevant when it comes to deciding where to locate a
plant, for example, substantially threatens the ability of individual governments,
state or federal, to regulate the activities of such entities effectively. The fact that
capital moves relatively freely from state to state also means that investment can
41. See, e.g., Hearings, supra note 39.
42. Of course, it can be horizontal as well, for example, when states try to take advantage of
other states. See, e.g., Kassel v. Consolidated Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981). These issues,
however, involve only states and are controlled by the relationship of state law to the Commerce
Clause.
43. For a discussion of the power of transnational corporations and their impact on politics, see
SUSAN STRANGE, THE DIFFUSION OF POWER IN THE WORLD ECONOMY 44-54 (1996) ("the progressive
integration of the world economy has shifted the balance of power away from states toward world
markets. That shift has led to the transfer of some powers in relation to civil society from territo-
rial states to TNC's.") [hereinafter DIFFUSION OF POWER1.
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sometimes leave as quickly as it came." The jurisdictional difficulties faced by
states trying to influence such actors cannot be dealt with as they were during
the New Deal, when federal regulatory regimes leveled the playing field nation-
wide, and that usually was good enough. There are now many other countries
involved and international approaches are necessary if state intervention and a
more cooperative approach to international governance is the goal.45 If a strong
state laissez-faire response is the goal, then maximum decentralization of power
would further that kind of global economy. As I shall argue below, however, this
should be a political decision, not one subject to constitutional dictates by the Su-
preme Court. It should be one subject to change by the government of the day.
In short, the transnational or horizontal character of multinational corpora-
tions involves significant independent power relationships that substantially
undercut the power of states to influence these entities according to what states
may perceive as their own interests. The economic power of some transnational
organizations and their constraining effects on states makes them somewhat
akin to states, at least in so far as their social and structural effects.46 Such
private-power centers are transnational in nature and, thus, cannot easily be reg-
ulated by uniform domestic rules, even at the national level.
A global perspective on power allocation issues between federal and state gov-
ernments thus provides us with additional criteria with which to evaluate the
Court's federalism decisions. It also creates additional concerns when it comes to
global governance and the role of individual states in that process. As we begin to
analyze concepts of federalism from a global perspective, democracy and public
participation questions loom large. Traditional federalism responses and calls for
a return to pre-New Deal days do not necessarily solve these problems, given the
global dispersion of power that now exists. Just as it is impossible to recreate the
sense of the private that existed in an earlier historic era, it is impossible to view
states as independent units of power, unaffected by actors and problems that do
not correlate with geographic boundaries. It may be that there needs to be more
local control over certain issues, but there may also need to be new forms of gov-
44. See generally SUSAN STRANGE, CASINO CAPITALISM (1986) (comparing the Western finance
and investment systems to Las Vegas casinos).
45. See GROUP OF LISBON, LIMITS TO COMPETITION xiii-xxi (1995).
46. See DIFFUSION OF POWER, supra note 43, at 54 (arguing that if one excludes war and peace
and focuses more broadly on day-to-day economic issues, transnational corporations have come to
play a significant role in determining "who gets what" in the world system).
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ernance and participation at the global level. Judicial approaches that unnecessar-
ily limit these new possibilities may do more harm than good by, in effect, playing
a role somewhat akin to the role the Court played as this country began, politically,
to come to grips with the legal and economic implications of a national economy.47
II. SOVEREIGNTY, FEDERALISM, AND THE COURT
The Court's recent opinions declaring certain federal acts in violation of the
Commerce Clause or the Tenth Amendment imply a rights conception of state
sovereignty.48 Such strong-state assumptions are at odds with the fluid and
multilevel mix of governmental and private partnerships characteristic of glo-
balization within the United States. The Court's notion of state sovereignty is
steeped in nineteenth century precedents, entailing a view of state power that re-
gards member states as separate and distinct in relation to each other and relative
to the federal government. Just as nation-states are not autonomous entities, in-
dividual member states are also integral to the global economy.49 Indeed while
the prevailing metaphor of federalism is the vertical dimension, it is important
to recognize these lateral relationships, particularly as private-public partner-
ships multiply and disperse power centers.
The Court's opinions also reflect an aspect of public choice theory by em-
phasizing accountability and cost as important bases for its decisions, especially
in situations where the federal government attempts to use the apparatus of
states to implement its policies. In so doing, however, the Court emphasizes the
importance of differentiating clearly between the levels of government respon-
sible for these additional costs. In its view, democracy, freedom, and liberty
require that those who make decisions should be accountable to the electorate
47. See generally ELLIS HAWLEY, THE NEW DEAL AND THE PROBLEM OF MONOPOLY (1969); see also,
ARCHIBALD Cox, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 117-38 (1987).
48. See, e.g., Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991); New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144
(1992); United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995); Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997);
United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000).
49. Cf. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 655 (2000) (Souter, J., dissenting) ("The facts that
cannot be ignored today are the facts of integrated national commerce and a political relationship be-
tween States and Nation much affected by their respective treasuries and constitutional modifica-
tions adopted by the people. The federalism of some earlier time is no more adequate to account for
those facts today than the theory of laissez-faire was able to govern the national economy 70 years
ago."). See generally J.A. CAMILLERI & J. FALK, THE END OF SOVEREIGNTY (1992) (discussing the effects
of political theory and rhetoric on the conflict between political integration and fragmentation).
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who must pay the costs of those decisions.5" Unfunded mandates, in this sense,
violate the spirit of democracy and undermine accountability for those who are
responsible fur their costs.5" While this may be true, it does not follow that fund-
ing for some programs might not follow along, were the politics to change so as
to favor or demand it. These decisions constitutionally stop such political pro-
cesses before they even begin.
A. State Sovereignty
The Court's conception of state sovereignty as self-contained in nineteenth
century terms is most apparent in Gregory v. Ashcroft.52 At issue in Ashcroft was
Missouri's mandatory retirement law for state judges. That law had been chal-
lenged as a violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA)
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. In rejecting
these claims, Justice O'Connor, writing for the majority, found that the ADEA
was not applicable, using a "plain statement" statutory interpretive approach to
reach that result, one infused with federalistic values and constitutional assump-
tions. In so doing, Justice O'Connor emphasized the sovereignty of states in a
fashion that suggested a zero-sum game approach to the allocation of federal
and state power. She writes:
As every schoolchild learns, our Constitution establishes a system
of dual sovereignty between the States and the Federal Govern-
ment. This Court has recognized this fundamental principle. In
Tafflin v. Levitt "[w]e beg[a]n with the axiom that, under our fed-
eral system, the states possess sovereignty concurrent with that of
50. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 577 (1995) (Kennedy, J. concurring) ("Were
the Federal Government to take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state concern,
areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commercial activities, the boundaries between
the spheres of federal and state authority would blur and political responsibility would become
illusory."); see also Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 919 (1997) ("The Framers' experience
under the Articles of Confederation had persuaded them that using the States as the instruments
of federal governance was both ineffectual and provocative of federal-state conflict .... The Con-
stitution thus contemplates that a State's government will represent and remain accountable to its
own citizens.").
51. See Printz, 521 U.S. at 919.
52. 501 U.S. 452 (1991).
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the Federal Government, subject only to limitations imposed by
the Supremacy Clause."
53
Justice O'Connor then goes on to quote from an 1869 case that describes the
constitutional scheme of dual sovereigns in greater detail:
'[T]he people of each State compose a State, having its own gov-
ernment, and endowed with all the functions essential to separate
and independent existence ... ,' '[W]ithout the States in union,
there could be no such political body as the United States.' Not
only, therefore, can there be no loss of separate and independent
autonomy to the States, through their union under the Constitu-
tion, but it may be not unreasonably said that the preservation of
the States, and the maintenance of their governments, are as much
within the design and care of the Constitution as the preservation
of the Union and the maintenance of the National government.
The Constitution, in all its provisions, looks to an indestructible
Union, composed of indestructible States."54
The idea of sovereignty propounded by Justice O'Connor implies a bright
line between the powers of states and the national government. Her sense of that
line seems strongly anchored in a sense of place typical of approaches to states
prevalent in the nineteenth century.5 5 Such approaches minimize the zone of
overlap that can (and often should) exist between two sovereigns. Once again,
this concept of sovereignty is not an end in itself, but a way of securing "the citi-
zens the liberties that derive from the diffusion of sovereign power."56 Indeed, it
is like the doctrine of separation of powers: "The Constitutional authority of
Congress cannot be expanded by the 'consent' of the government unit whose do-
main is thereby narrowed, whether that unit is the Executive Branch or the
53. Id. at 457 (quoting Tafflin v. Levitt, 493 U.S. 455, 458 (1990)(internal citations omitted)).
54. Id. (quoting Texas v. White, 7 Wall. 700, 725 (1869), (quoting Lane County v. Oregon, 7
Wall. 71, 76 (1869))).
55. See Alexander B. Murphy, The Sovereign State System as Political-Territorial Ideal: Historical
and Contemporary Considerations, in STATE SOVEREIGNTY As SOCIAL CONSTRUCT 81-93, 100-02
(Thomas J. Biersteker & Cynthia Weber eds., 1996).
56. New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 160, 181 (1992).
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States."57 The Court believes that sovereignty, so conceived, is essential to the in-
frastructure of policymaking. Not unlike the doctrine of separation of powers
aimed at preventing the aggregation of power by any one branch of government,
federalism and state sovereignty also reflect commitment to distributed power
as a basis for civil liberty. As Justice O'Connor notes:
This federalist structure of joint sovereigns preserves to the
people numerous advantages. It assures a decentralized govern-
ment that will be more sensitive to the diverse needs of a hetero-
gen[e]ous society; it increases opportunity for citizen involvement
in democratic processes; it allows for more innovation and exper-
imentation in government; and it makes government more re-
sponsive by putting the States in competition for a mobile
citizenry.
58
Indeed, in the majority's view, the constitutional scheme requires clear lines
demarcating the powers exercised by the states from those exercised by the na-
tional government. "Just as the separation and independence of the coordinate
branches of the Federal Government serve to prevent the accumulation of exces-
sive power in any one branch, a healthy balance of power between the States and
the Federal Government will reduce the risk of tyranny and abuse from either
front."59
The notion of sovereignty on which the Court's rationales are based fails to
consider that many private actors within states have power on the level of states
themselves." Justice Breyer, speaking for the four Justices who often dissent to-
gether in recent federalism cases, emphasized the potential negative ramifica-
tions of the Court's decisions on the effectiveness of government in his dissent in
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina Ports Authority.6' In that case, the
Court held that state sovereign immunity prevented Congress from compelling
a state to answer the complaints of private parties before the administrative
57. Id. at 182.
58. Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 458 (1991).
59. Id.
60. See IAN HARDEN, THE CONTRACTING STATE 7-8 (1992); see also PATRICK BIRKINSHAW ET AL.,
GOVERNMENT BY MOONLIGHT: THE HYBRID PARTS OF THE STATE (1990).
61. 535 U.S. 743, 786 (2002) (Breyer, J. dissenting).
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tribunal of a federal agency.62 Breyer argued that federal administrative agencies
are not covered by the Eleventh Amendment since they do not exercise the judi-
cial power of the United States.63 He adds that the practical consequences of the
opinion are negative:
The decision, while permitting an agency to bring enforcement
actions against States, forbids it to use agency adjudication in
order to help decide whether to do so. Consequently the agency
must rely more heavily upon its own informal staff investigations
in order to decide whether a citizen's complaint has merit. The
natural result is less agency flexibility, a larger federal bureau-
cracy, less fair procedure, and potentially less effective law
enforcement .... At least one of these consequences, the forced
growth of the unnecessary federal bureaucracy, undermines the
very constitutional objectives the Court's decision claims to
serve.
64
When viewed from a global context, the goals mentioned by the Court's fed-
eralist majority (heterogeneity, democracy, innovation, and a mobile citizenry)
look different from when they are seen as a function of federal and state power
operating jointly, but alone. Global competition and the incentives for states to
attract and retain private foreign investment encourage integration rather than
difference. Moreover, most states seek to minimize public costs so as to maxi-
mize their appeal to private investment. Thus, while democracy may very well
be furthered by keeping certain issues local, globalization creates important
pressures toward transnationalism at the local level, where minority interests
may have even fewer procedural protections than at the federal level. Thus, fed-
eralist privileging of the local may be at the expense of a more vibrant national
democracy, one that allows citizens an opportunity not only to vote and express
themselves, but, crucially, to form coalitions across state boundaries giving mi-
nority groups a greater chance to aggregate their power and to speak in a more
audible voice. Indeed, the kind of segmented citizenship that the Court espouses
does not accord with the complex realities and multiple citizenship identities
62. Id. at 760.
63. Id. at 777 (Breyer, J. dissenting).
64. See id. at 785-86.
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that the global economy produces." Federalism denationalizes issues and it un-
bundles the concept of citizenship, fragmenting our political responses and fur-
ther disaggregating the public.
More important, public innovation, too, is likely to be homogenized and only
take the form of minimal taxes and lower regulatory costs, though this, in turn,
may encourage more private experimentation. Yet, the greater the number of ac-
tivities that move from the public realm to the private sector, the greater the risk
that global currency coined at the local level will be at the expense of the weakest
members of society.66 The intense competitiveness that this model encourages
may, indeed, encourage more mobility among citizens in their quest to find a
modicum of financial stability. Such mobility, though, will most likely occur at the
higher end of the income spectrum, rather than the lower.67 Freedom in the sense
of making national action more difficult to achieve may be enhanced, but at the
expense of developing a more cooperative model of global capitalism at the inter-
national and national levels. Greater decentralization may also lead to a race to the
bottom in some areas,68 but more importantly, it raises the transaction costs in-
volved in achieving more cooperative approaches to coping with the problems of
global capitalism and the externalities of globalization.69
The idea of a state's integrity is at the basis of the majority's opinion in New
York v. United States.7" Once again, the Court is more concerned with the forms
of power, rather than with structures that make it easy to exercise power in a
flexible way. In this case, the Court dealt with the constitutionality of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985. The Act in question
was the result of various state efforts to devise a federal structure for the regula-
tion of low-level waste that avoided federal preemption and retained a role for
states to play. In many ways, the legislative process was akin to the negotiation
65. See, e.g., Dennis Conway, Are There New Complexities In Global Migration Systems of Conse-
quence For the United States "Nation-State"?, 2 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 31, 35-43 (1994) (dis-
cussing international mobility, the world as an interconnected community, and how individuals
relate to and identify with more than one country at a time).
66. See WILLIAM GREIDER, ONE WORLD, READY OR NOT 360-87 (1997). See generally GARY
TEEPLE, GLOBALIZATION AND THE DECLINE OF SOCIAL REFORM 69-74 (1995) (discussing the move
from nationalism to globalization as it affects financial theory).
67. See generally SASKIA SASSEN, CITIES IN A WORLD ECONOMY (1994).
68. See Esty, supra note 23, at 627-38.
69. See Rubin and Feeley, supra note 25.
70. 505 U.S. 144 (1992).
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and the enactment of a treaty, whereby the individual states involved retained
considerable flexibility when it came to meeting their regulatory obligations.
The Act was the result of a cooperative approach to federalism that allows states
to maintain flexibility and the primary regulatory role in their traditional realm
of protecting public health and safety.7' The federal government set the basic
standards, but rather than pre-empting state law, the Act allowed states to de-
sign policies their lawmakers believed best achieved the federal standards.72 As
one commentator noted: "In theory, the system allows states to experiment and
innovate, but not to sacrifice public health and welfare in a bidding war to at-
tract industry."
' 73
Specifically, Congress sought to achieve its federal goals by creating certain
incentives to ensure that states provide for the disposal of radioactive waste gen-
erated within their borders. States were authorized to impose a surcharge on
radioactive waste received from other states, a portion of which would be col-
lected by the Secretary of Energy and placed in a trust account for those states
that achieved a series of milestones in developing waste disposal sites.74 States
were also authorized to increase the costs of access to sites to those states that did
not meet federal guidelines, eventually denying them access altogether.
None of these "incentives" violated the Court's sense of state sovereignty. A
third incentive, however, provided that a state that fails to provide for the dis-
posal of all internally generated waste by a particular date must, in most cases,
take title to and possession of the waste and become liable for all damages suf-
fered by the waste's generator or owner as a result of the state's failure to
71. As Justice White described it, concurring in part and dissenting in part:
[The Act] resulted from the efforts of state leaders to achieve a state-based set of
remedies to the waste problem. They sought not federal pre-emption or interven-
tion, but rather congressional sanction of interstate compromises they had reached.
[The] 1985 Act was very much the product of cooperative federalism, in which the
States bargained among themselves to achieve compromises for Congress to
sanction .... Unlike legislation that directs action from the Federal Government to
the States, the [Congressional action] reflected hard-fought agreements among
States as refereed by Congress. Id. at 189-90, 194.
72. See generally Adam Babich, Our Federalism, Our Hazardous Waste, and Our Good Fortune, 54
MD. L. REV. 1516 (1995) (discussing the application of this notion to the example of hazardous
waste control).
73. Id. at 1532-33.
74. 505 U.S. at 152.
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promptly take possession.75 For the Court, this provision created constitutional
problems.76 In rejecting Congress' attempt to force certain states to take title to
and possession of low-level waste, the Court emphasized that Congress could
not force the states to regulate in ways that made them direct agents of the fed-
eral government. Congress could regulate individuals, but not states, because
states were sovereign:
In providing for a stronger central government, therefore, the
Framers explicitly chose a Constitution that confers upon Con-
gress the power to regulate individuals, not States. As we have
seen, the Court has consistently respected this choice. We have al-
ways understood that even where Congress has the authority
under the Constitution to pass laws requiring or prohibiting cer-
tain acts, it lacks the power directly to compel the States to require
or prohibit those acts. The allocation of power contained in the
Commerce Clause, for example, authorizes Congress to regulate
interstate commerce directly; it does not authorize Congress to
regulate state governments' regulation of interstate commerce.
77
In the majority's view, "[t]he take title provision offers state governments a
'choice' of either accepting ownership of waste or regulating according to the in-
structions of Congress." 78 Either type of federal action would "commandeer"
state governments into the service of federal regulatory purposes, and would for
75. Id. at 153-54.
76. Writing for the majority, Justice O'Connor noted:
The actual scope of the Federal Government's authority with respect to the States
has changed over the years, therefore, but the constitutional structure underlying
and limiting that authority has not. In the end, just as a cup may be half empty or
half full, it makes no difference whether one views the question at issue in these
cases as one of ascertaining the limits of the power delegated to the Federal Govern-
ment under the affirmative provisions of the Constitution or one of discerning the
core of sovereignty retained by the States under the Tenth Amendment. Either way,
we must determine whether any of the three challenged provisions of the Low-
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 oversteps the boundary
between federal and state authority. Id. at 159.
77. See id. at 166.
78. Id. at 175. It is interesting to note that New York was involved in the political process that
produced this result. The Supreme Court, however, rejected arguments to the effect that New
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this reason be inconsistent with the Constitution's division of authority between
federal and state governments.
In short, the Court's concept of state sovereignty precludes states from en-
tering into agreements to take certain kinds of actions to carry out their promises
in the federal legislative process-unlike countries that enter into a treaty and
agree to enact certain enabling legislation to realize its goals.
The Court's more recent federalism decisions take the principles of democ-
racy, accountability and cost a step further. In Printz v. United States,79 for ex-
ample, the Court struck down the Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act on
grounds that the federal government was, in effect, commandeering the state's
enforcement apparatus to carry out a federal policy. There was little doubt that
Congress had the power to regulate in this area, but it could not force states to
carry out its mandates. Writing for the majority, Justice Scalia emphasized the
structural rather than the textual nature of this decision."0 He also emphasized
democracy and accountability:
We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold that
Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by conscripting the
State's officers directly. The Federal Government may neither
issue directives requiring the States to address particular prob-
lems, nor command the States' officers, or those of their political
subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal regulatory pro-
gram. It matters not whether policymaking is involved, and no
case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is necessary; such
commands are fundamentally incompatible with our constitu-
tional system of dual sovereignty.8
York had, in effect, consented to these federal regulations, stating that "[w]here Congress exceeds
its authority relative to the States the departure cannot be ratified by the 'consent' of state offi-
cials." Id. at 182. Compare id. at 198-205 (discussing how the states just wanted Congress to sanc-
tion their agreement) (White, J., dissenting).
79. 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
80. Id. at 932-33.
81. Id. at 935.
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As Justice Stevens emphasized in dissent, the result in this case had no tex-
tual basis in the Constitution."2 More important for our purposes, it relied once
again on a concept of sovereignty with little bearing on global realities. Only Jus-
tice Breyer chose to see this case in comparative-if not global terms-noting
that no other federal system in the world today would prevent the use of state
enforcement powers in this way.
8 3
Viewed from a global perspective, the "all or nothing" quality of the Court's
approach both overstates and understates what is at stake. It overstates the poten-
tial restructuring effects of power flowing from one body to another, as power has
flowed from the states to the federal government for over two hundred years. In
a global economy, multi-governmental approaches may often be necessary and
power arrangements should be more fluid. Constitutionalizing these decisions re-
moves a good deal of this flexibility. At the same time, the Court's approach to
power levels also understates what is at stake to the extent that it overlooks entirely
the fact that nonstate actors, especially transnational corporations, are now major
power centers, in many ways comparable to states. Thus, a concept of federalism
that does not include a sense of how global power is allocated today runs the seri-
ous risk of undermining the very goals it seeks to further--democracy and liberty.
It may be that moving some decisions to the national level can more easily neutral-
ize inappropriate uses of private power. Be that as it may, constitutionalizing cer-
tain results removes an important political option.
B. The Commerce Power
Apart from issues involving the use of a state's own enforcement apparatus,
the ability of Congress to regulate at the national level has also been limited by
the Court's view of the commerce power. In United States v. Lopez,84 the consti-
tutionality of the Gun-Free School Zone Act of 1990 was at issue. This Act
"made it a federal offense 'for any individual knowingly to possess a firearm at a
82. Id. at 944 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
83. See id. at 976 (Breyer, J., dissenting) ("At least some other countries, facing the same basic
problem, have found that local control is better maintained through application of a principle that
is the direct opposite of the principle the majority derives from the silence of our Constitution.
The federal systems of Switzerland, Germany and the European Union, for example, all provide
that constituent states, not federal bureaucracies, will themselves implement many of the laws,
rules, regulations, or decrees enacted by the central 'federal' body.").
84. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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place that the individual knows, or has reasonable cause to believe, is a school
zone.' '8 5 For the majority, this was "a criminal statute that by its terms has
nothing to do with 'commerce' or any sort of economic enterprise, however
broadly one might define those terms."" Moreover, according to the majority,
the argument that guns in a school zone may result in violent crime that substan-
tially affects interstate commerce proves too much. "Thus, if we were to accept
the Government's arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an in-
dividual that Congress is without power to regulate."8" Indeed, the majority
feared that a decision holding this Act to be within Congress' Commerce Clause
power would convert Congressional authority under that clause to a general po-
lice power of the sort retained by States. The Court thus concluded that the com-
merce power was not infinitely expandable, and that there are limitations
"inherent in the very language of the Commerce Clause."8
Justices Kennedy and O'Connor concurred, emphasizing the policy benefits
of a governmental structure that divides power between federal and state au-
thorities: "the theory that two governments accord more liberty than one re-
quires for its realization two distinct and discernable lines of political
accountability: one between the citizens and the Federal Government; the sec-
ond between the citizens and the States."89
This kind of separation was crucial for true accountability to occur:
If, as Madison expected, the federal and state governments are
to... hold each other in check by competing for the affections of
the people, those citizens must have some means of knowing
which of the two governments to hold accountable for failure to
perform a given function .... Were the Federal Government to
take over the regulation of entire areas of traditional state con-
cern, areas having nothing to do with the regulation of commer-
cial activities, the boundaries between the spheres of federal and
state authority would blur and political responsibility would be-
come illusory.9
0
85. Id. at 551 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1)(A) (Supp. V 1988)).
86. Id. at 561.
87. Id. at 564.
88. Id. at 553.
89. Id. at 576.
90. Id. at 576-77.
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These policy justifications for the textual interpretation given by the major-
ity are very much based on a conception of the state as a unitary entity, where cit-
izens clearly differentiate among those who exercise power. Of course, citizens
of the states also have a vote at the federal level and the idea that they are easily
fooled by the federal level of government at the expense of the states may not
give sufficient credit to the discerning nature of the voters involved. But quite
apart from the policy arguments, there is the broader claim that guns, violence
and the global economy are all interrelated, especially when education is
involved.
In his dissenting opinion in Lopez, Justice Breyer takes a very different per-
spective on this case, focusing more on the school children involved and on the
interrelationships between education and the national economy and beyond.9'
Indeed, he emphasizes that education and business are directly related: "techno-
logical changes and innovations in management techniques have altered the na-
ture of the workplace so that more jobs now demand greater educational
skills."92 Three Justices joined in dissent, but Justice Breyer was the only Justice
to make the link between the national economy and global competition:
[G]lobal competition also has made primary and secondary edu-
cation economically more important. The portion of the Ameri-
can economy attributable to international trade nearly tripled
between 1950 and 1980, and more than 70 percent of American-
made goods now compete with imports. Yet lagging worker pro-
ductivity has contributed to negative trade balances and to real
hourly compensation that has fallen below wages in 10 other in-
dustrialized nations. At least some significant part of this serious
productivity problem is attributable to students who emerge from
classrooms without the reading or mathematical skills necessary
to compete with their European or Asian counterparts.
93
Justice Breyer seems to have a clear concept of global competition. His
premise is that every school child will eventually compete for jobs against other
91. Id. at 620.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 621 (internal citations omitted).
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school children all over the globe. Local jobs and prosperity will turn on the out-
come of this competition. He notes "there is evidence that, today more than ever,
many firms base their location decisions upon the presence, or absence, of a work
force with a basic education."" For Justice Breyer, guns, education, and business
are interrelated: "The economic links I have just sketched seem fairly obvious."95
He questions "Why then is it not equally obvious, in light of those links, that a
widespread, serious, and substantial physical threat to teaching and learning also
substantially threatens the commerce to which that teaching and learning is in-
extricably tied?"96
For Justice Breyer, the links between local violence, education, and success
in the global economy are sufficiently direct to justify federal involvement.
Though he takes a global perspective on the issues before him, his judicial ap-
proach to the commerce clause is reminiscent of Wickard v. Filburn.97 Though
Justice Breyer is quick to add that his approach does not "obliterate the distinc-
tion between what is national and what is local,"98 his willingness to define the
national interest by looking beyond national borders to an interdependent glo-
bal economy, represents an approach that ultimately would vest most regulatory
decisions at the federal level, should the national government decide to act.99 In
short, globalization does not necessarily render concepts of state sovereignty
based on territory irrelevant, but a national government intent on maximizing
94. Id.
95. Id. at 622.
96. Id. at 622-23.
97. 317 U.S. 111, 127-29 (1942). (upholding the application of the Agricultural Adjustment Act
to the planting and consumption of homegrown wheat)
98. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 557 (1995).
99. One could argue that Justice Breyer's approach proves too much, i.e., the links between glo-
bal and domestic economies are so apparent as to assure a federal result. As this article argues, the
distinction between the global and various forms of the local has collapsed; this does not mean
Congress must automatically act. It is not compelled to act. Rather, the issues are now political is-
sues to be acted on in the political process, without such judicial intervention, as contemplated in
Lopez. Justice Stevens argues state sovereignty is protected through the political process: "[i]t is the
Framers' compromise giving each State equal representation in the Senate that provides the prin-
cipal structural protection for the sovereignty of the several States." Kimel v. Florida Bd. of Re-
gents, 528 U.S. 62, 93 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). He adds that,
"[flederalism concerns do make it appropriate for Congress to speak clearly when it regulates state
action. But when it does so... we can safely presume that the burdens the statute imposes on the
sovereignty of the several States were taken into account during the deliberative process leading to
the enactment of the measure. Id. at 96.
FEDERALISM THROUGH A GLOBAL LENS
competitiveness in a global economy is at cross purposes with itself when it opts
to constitutionalize such issues rather than seek a national, political consensus.
Perhaps the Court should not be faulted for analyzing federalism issues in a
framework that is dominated by nineteenth century concepts of federalism em-
bodied in nineteenth century precedents. Yet, in the Court's effort to re-establish
what often appears to be a pre-New Deal position vis-A,-vis national power, it is
overlooking an aspect of New Deal judicial processes that remains highly rele-
vant for the global state. As just noted, courts should avoid constitutionalizing
issues when it is not necessary to do so. Though the Court may have been con-
cerned with costs unnecessarily imposed on states, such matters are best dealt
with legislatively. Diluted federal power need not be the inevitable outcome of
the global state, and courts need not be drawn into taking the lead in sculpting
the state of the future. It is ironic that at the edge of the twenty-first century, the
Court would opt for constitutional approaches that unduly limit legislative flex-
ibility. The New Deal Court constitutionalized a political approach to issues.
The Rehnquist Court is constitutionalizing outcomes that unbundle the use of
federal power and, in the process, citizenship as well.
In suggesting that the Court's approach to federalism is insufficiently at-
tuned to the current fluidity and multi-centeredness of federal/state/private
power, I do not wish to be misread as advocating that the Court lend its author-
itative weight to globalization. Rather, I am suggesting that its construction of
federalism as entailing (or requiring) a preference for discrete powers of mem-
ber states is unlikely to achieve the goal of widening the political process. Quite
the contrary, local jurisdictions may be far more exposed to market constraints
than the country at large, with the result that citizens' roles in democratic delib-
eration are likely to be less substantial as a counter-weight to globalization, for
example, than at the federal level. In other words, a strict approach to federalism
is likely to increase the democracy deficit. In globalization, federalism is a form
of denationalization no less than the international public sphere and the trans-
nationalized private sector more often associated with this concept.
CONCLUSION
These denationalizing effects of federalism privilege markets and market
outcomes, underscoring the extent to which our current national policy looks to
the market as an arena of delegation and to market incentives as a substitute for
traditional regulation. The politics that produces these results in Congress has
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been emphatically reinforced in the Court's opinions in terms of the rhetoric of
its federalism decisions and in a way far more rigid than a purely political deci-
sion to place responsibility at the state instead of the federal level of government.
As we have just seen, this is particularly apparent in Supreme Court decisions
over the last decade or so.
The relationship between federalism and the democracy deficit may seem
counter-intuitive. Indeed, throughout the federalism cases discussed above, a
persistent rationale provided by the Court for its decisions is that the Court seeks
to increase democracy by ensuring that power in matters involving state issues
be exercised by officials closer to the people directly affected. The idea that de-
mocracy is enhanced if power is exercised geographically closer to those affected
tends to overstate territory and distance as general criteria for democracy. More
to the point, it ignores the "divide and conquer" effect that the denationalization
of decision making can have, particularly with regard to issues involving new
challenges on behalf of marginal constituents. Delegating power down or, in
effect, devolving power to the states, fragments minority and marginal constitu-
encies, sometimes to the point that these groups are effectively excluded. Send-
ing Head Start programs or other programs for the poor back to the state,
without specific federal funding and guidelines, makes such funding vulnerable
to the needs and politics of those states that may neither have the resources nec-
essary nor the political will for such programs. Though the theory of devolution
is that it increases democracy by bringing decisions closer to stakeholders, it can
have the opposite effect when those stakeholders are widely dispersed.
The likelihood of control by powerful local groups increases with decentral-
ization of political authority. As Professors Crenson and Ginsburg have pointed
out:
Madisonian logic suggests that small constituencies are more
likely than large ones to fall under the domination of a single in-
terest. Its hegemony may discourage opposing groups from mobi-
lizing, or it may use its political privilege to structure local
institutions so that other interests find it difficult to organize.
Organization ... is the mobilization of bias; some interests can be
organized into politics while others are organized out.'
100. CRENSON & GINSBERG, supra note 9, at 232.
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Quite apart from the intrusive role that courts now play in these contexts,
there are strong political and economic incentives at the state level that argue
pervasively for the devolution of regulatory and safety net issues. Given the in-
creasing competition that exists now at all levels of government for the attraction
and retention of economic investment to their respective territories, devolving
welfare responsibility or housing for the poor to the state level, for example,
means individual states will vary in their approaches to such issues and in the
priority they give to them. The financial capabilities of the states vary. Moreover,
as states compete for investment and the retention of taxpayers, they have dis-
tinct incentives to minimize the costs of redistributive programs such as welfare,
Medicaid, or poverty programs in general. Some states will reduce payments for
these programs more than others because of lack of funds; others, for ideological
reasons. Differences in state wealth and a politics of choice in such contexts, tend
to make poor constituencies far more vulnerable than when these interests are
aggregated at the national level.'' Political decisions such as these however, can
always be reversed. But when courts constitutionalize such issues, they lock in
these outcomes for generations to come, in effect taking them out of national
politics, and in reality, local politics as well.
When choices of interpretive approaches to constitutional doctrines exist,
those approaches that preserve, increase, or further the flexibility of decision-
makers' responses to the global economy should be preferred. Not unlike the
New Deal era when the Court had to confront new issues arising from society's
political responses to a newly emerging nationally integrated economy, the
Court today decides issues against a backdrop of an increasingly integrated
economy. An analysis of recent federalism decisions shows that it is important
that courts resist constitutional approaches that unnecessarily limit change or
new power-sharing approaches to both new and old issues. The deferential, con-
stitutional interpretive approaches forged by the Court during the New Deal era
may, in fact, be best suited for the political experimentation now necessary, espe-
cially if various levels of government and non-state actors are to adapt success-
fully to the realities of a global economy. This position, however, is not an
argument for a return to the New Deal as far as substance is concerned. There is
no going back to the twentieth century or to the state-centric future that courts
and law makers have envisioned for the greater part of this nation's history.
101. See id. at 231-33.
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